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Stan Barnero manklin unch phases Para Offline Signature Verification via **Structural Methods:** Graph Edit Distance and Inkball Models Sherman Huntington Paul Maergner, Nicholas R. Howe, Kaspar Riesen, Rolf Ingold, Andreas Fischer illian 17/08/2018 Nelson p. is Lightfoot Lee Matthew er Braxton

### Offline Signature Verification



#### Statistical vs. Structural Approach

#### **Statistical – Feature vectors**

- + large number of mathematical methods available
- fixed-size representation

#### Statistical vs. Structural Approach

#### **Our Approaches**

#### **Statistical – Feature vectors**

 $(X_1, ..., X_n)$ 

- + large number of mathematical methods available
- fixed-size representation

#### Structural – Graphs

- + flexible representation
- + binary relations
- high computational complexity

#### Two recent structural approaches

Graph-based Signature Verification Framework Introduced by Maergner et al. at ICDAR 2017 Bipartite approximation of graph edit distance Keypoint graphs

Inkball Models

Introduced by Howe at ICDAR 2013

Rooted tree and efficient matching algorithm

Never been applied to Signature Verification

#### $\rightarrow$ Use both methods individually and combined

# Keypoint graphs vs. Inkball models

Keypoint graphs vs. Inkball models

Both Models – Similar Nodes

End-/Junction points + additional points

Keypoint graphs – Edges



Edges connect neighboring points on the skeleton Not all parts of the graph are connected, contains circles Inkball models – Edges Rooted tree (no circles, all parts are connected)

Nodes are greedily connected to the nearest nodes

#### → Similar Representations

# Keypoint Graph



### Inkball Model



# Matching

## Graph Edit Distance Approach: Overview



### Graph Edit Distance (GED)

GED between  $g_1$  and  $g_2$ 

$$d(g_1, g_2) = \min_{(e_1, \dots, e_k) \in \Upsilon(g_1, g_2)} \sum_{i=1}^k c(e_i)$$

 $\Upsilon(g_1, g_2)$ Set of edit paths $c(e_i)$ Cost of edit operation  $e_i$ Edit operationsSubstitution/deletion/insertion of nodes and edges



### Inkball Model Approach: Overview



## Inkball matching



# **Signature Verification Score**

# Dissimilarity Score d(R,g)



## Multiple Classifier System (MCS)

- Simply linear combination with weight  $\alpha$
- Dissimilarity scores are z-score normalized based on reference signatures

$$d_{\text{MCS},\alpha}(R,t) = \min_{r \in R} \left( \alpha \cdot \hat{d}^*_{\text{GED}}(r,t) + (1-\alpha) \cdot \hat{d}^*_{\text{inkball}}(r,t) \right)$$

# Evaluation

#### **Evaluation Protocol**

Datasets

MCYT-75 and GPDS-75 (GPDSsynthetic-Offline)

Skilled forgeries (SF)

Forgers with access to the genuine signatures

Random forgeries (RF)

Signatures of other users; brute force attack

Two tasks

R5/R10 using 5/10 genuine signatures per user as reference

**Evaluation Measure** 

Equal Error Rate (EER)

	Skilled Forgeries					Random Forgeries					
System	GPDS-75		MCY	MCYT-75		GPDS-75			MCYT-75		
	R5	R10	R5	R10	-	R5	R10		R5	R10	
Maergner et al. ( $\alpha = 1.0$ , GED app.)	11.96	9.42	20.36	14.40		4.90	3.60		6.25	2.92	
Proposed Inkball $(\alpha = 0.0)$	14.09	10.36	12.98	10.49		7.75	5.51		5.19	3.46	

	Skilled Forgeries				 Random Forgeries					
System	GPDS-75		MCYT-75		 GPDS-75		MCYT-75			
	R5	R10	R5	R10	R5	R10		R5	R10	
Maergner et al. ( $\alpha = 1.0$ , GED app.)	11.96	9.42	20.36	14.40	4.90	3.60		6.25	2.92	
Proposed Inkball $(\alpha = 0.0)$	14.09	10.36	12.98	10.49	7.75	5.51		5.19	3.46	
Proposed MCS $(\alpha = 0.4)$	9.42	6.84	13.07	8.71	3.66	2.05		3.06	1.24	

#### Average EER over ten random selections of 10 reference signatures

Sustam	GPDS-75 R10			MCYT-75 R10			
System	RF SF			RF	SF		
Ferrer et al.	0.76*	16.01		0.35*	11.54		
Maergner et al. (GED app.)	2.73	8.29		2.83	12.01		
Proposed Inkball ( $\alpha = 0.0$ )	5.22	10.64		3.13	8.29		
Proposed MCS ( $\alpha = 0.4$ )	1.99	<mark>6.67</mark>		1.88	7.20		

\*: All genuine signatures of other users as RF

#### EER Results with a posteriori user-dependent score normalization

Sustam	MCYT-	75 R5	MCYT-	MCYT-75 R10			
System	RF	SF	RF	SF			
Alonso-Fernandez et al.	9.79*	23.78	7.26*	22.13			
Fierrez-Aguilar et al.	2.69**	11.00	1.14**	9.28			
Gilperez et al.	2.18*	10.18	1.18*	6.44			
Maergner et al. (GED app.)	2.40	14.49	1.89	11.64			
Proposed Inkball ( $\alpha = 0.0$ )	2.88	9.33	2.02	8.53			
Proposed MCS ( $\alpha = 0.4$ )	0.92	9.07	0.52	5.78			

\*: All genuine signatures of other users as RF

\*\*: First 5 genuine signature from each other user as RF

#### Conclusion

Two structural methods for signature verification inkball models used for the first time

Excellent signature verification performance for skilled forgeries on MCYT-75 and GPDS-75 room for improvement for random forgeries

Combination achieves best results two complementary methods

### Outlook

Further develop structural representations other types of nodes and edges improved cost functions

Include stability models

which parts of the structure are stable?

Make matching visible for human expert

#### Thank you for your attention! Questions?